Zwischen legitimem Lobbyismus und illegitimen Beeinflussungsmethoden

Der Fall Bayer und das Glyphosatzulassungsverfahren in Mexiko

Abstract

The political decision-making process is influenced by stakeholders, and one means of steering legislative decisions is lobbying. However, the example of the glyphosate approval process in Mexico shows the negative consequences that can be caused by profit-oriented actions of companies or government representatives. The actors operate in a multi-layered structure and the exertion of influence is characterized by intransparency. A central aspect of this thesis is therefore to show the differences between necessary lobbying and illegitimate methods of influence. For this purpose, the theory of state crime serves as a generic term under which state-corporate-crime, corruption, the phenomenon of revolving doors and lobbyism are subordinated. With the help of these theoretical approaches, the complex interactions of the actors in the example can be broken down and then analyzed in a case-oriented manner. The glyphosate approval proceedings show that further action is needed to regulate illegitimate methods of influence.